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Ralph Potter has noted that "the use of a label such as 'mentally
retarded' is a highly risky and ambiguous moral enterprise." 1 In this
essay I will examine the ways in which the application of labels supposedly denoting some form of mental inability has exposed men and
women to a particularly serious risk: the threat of being permanently
sterilized by the state independently of any personal choice. Since
1907, thirty states have at one time or another had laws which permitted the state to sterilize coercively those who were regarded as
"feebleminded," "mentally ill," or perhaps "habitually prone to crime."
Originally passed during the height of the eugenics craze, these laws
have, in some cases, been rewritten to meet the scientific skepticism
which has rejected their original basis; nevertheless, the risk of being
permanently sterilized still faces those who are deemed mentally inadequate by the state. 2
In many cases these laws have been tested in the courts to determine what power the state has to prevent those it labels "undesirable"
from ever bearing children or ever bearing them again. This essay will
examine these judicial decisions in an effort to uncover: first, a series
of assumptions about the meaning of the label "retarded" which
definitely color judicial perceptions of retardation, and second, basic
patterns of ethical reasoning about the nature and status of the rights
of the retarded which underlie these court decisions. I shall attempt to
lay open the interaction between assumptions about labels and patterns of moral reasoning which shape these decisions, and indeed,
much of our public policy with regard to the retarded. 3
In these decisions, courts were faced with serious new questions for
which "mechanical jurisprudence, " in Pound's famous phrase, left
them ill prepared. Deductive appeals to precedent were not enough and
rarely are in these difficult areas where law, ethics, and political philosophy intermingle,4 as a number of writers have shown. Hence, these
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decisions are marked by frequent expressions of ethical reasoning
exemplified in the avowal of one supreme court that "every forward
step in the progress of the race has been marked by an interference
with individual liberties." 5 It thus becomes an important enterprise to
examine the impact of labeling in the context of specific types of
ethical reasoning which have exerted a powerful influence in shaping
state action toward the retarded and the insane.
I.

Though courts have not been unanimous in their judgments as to
the rights of the retarded and the powers of the state, most have
manifested little concern for any fundamental rights of the retarded. 6
For example, in Buck us Bell (1927), the major Supreme Court decision in this area, Justice Holmes never referred to any supposed rights
of the individual. He simply referred to state sterilization as a "lesser
sacrifice" that some persons are called upon to undergo for the state.
For purposes of precedent, he compared it to compulsory vaccination
which the Court had already upheld. 7 Precisely the same analogy had
been employed earlier by courts in Michigan and Virginia to legitimate
state sterilization of the retarded.
This analogy to "public health" legislation is interesting for two
reasons. First, it clearly suggests the essentially "social health" claim
which was at the base of the early legislative activity in this area.
Second, it suggests an important assumption about the threat posed
by retardation. Retardation is likened to a disease which spread~
throughout the community if not checked. Furthermore, it would
seem that if this analogy is really serviceable, one would have to see
some imminent threat to all the members of the community to justify
this vaccination against the disease. This was precisely the situation in
which the Supreme Court upheld compulsory vaccination. 8
While Holmes simply ignored anything that might be called a right
to procreate, a somewhat more obvious discussion is found in State us
Troutman, a 1931 Idaho case involving sterilization on strictly eugenic
grounds, in which the court said in part: "If there be any natural right
for mental defectives to beget children, that right must give way to the
police power of the state in protecting the common welfare, so far as
it can be protected, against this type of hereditary feeblemindedness."9 This court recognizes at least a potential human right involved,
but it is not even sure that such a right exists. Even if it granted that
such a right exists, it seems clear that this court would view the state
as possessing the power to suppress it permanently for eugenic reasons. In such a situation, it is a serious question whether or not the
right is seen as a fundamental human right or merely as one interest
among many. Furthermore, we must note again the adoption of a
definite perception about the meaning of retardation as a threat which
May, 1978
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stands ready to inundate the society with genotypically retarded offspring unless stopped.
This decision appeared as one of five that were handed down by
state supreme courts in the five years immediately after the Supreme
Court ruling in Bell. Courts in Utah, Idaho, Kansas, Nebraska, and
Oklahoma all relied upon Bell to uphold the power of the state to
sterilize the retarded and the insane. Among these, even State us
Schaffer, which seems most sensitive to the issues involved, still did
not see any fundamental right of the individual involved:
The interest of the individual invaded by the statute is of the highest order,
and the invasion can be justified only as a major necessary protection to
some more important interest. Reducing this problem of reconciliation of
personal liberty and government restraint to its lowest biological terms, the
two functions indispensable to the continued existence of human life are
nutrition and reproduction. Without nutrition the individual dies; without
reproduction the race dies. Procreation of defective and feebleminded chilo
dren with criminal tendencies does not advantage, but patently disadvan·
tages, the race. Reproduction turns adversary and thwarts the ultimate end
and purpose of reproduction. The race may insure its own perpetuation and
such progeny may be prevented in the interest of the higher general welfare. 10

This passage does not actually discuss procreation in terms of rights.
It begins by describing the activity as an interest which a general

concern for human liberty might protect from state intrusion. Describing the activity only as an interest means that the court can easily
decide that when some state interest (defined here in eugenic terms) is
asserted, it can overwhelm this merely private interest. Here there is
no balancing of rights, but only a view that allows a somewhat vague
personal interest to be sacrificed when it runs afoul of the benefits to
be derived from state action.
A similar lack of serious consideration of procreative rights has
continued to appear in court decisions relating to the retarded in the
last decade. Local courts in Ohio, Maryland, and Missouri have
ordered sterilization of the retarded in the absence of specific state
law when existing statutes gave them broad but ambiguously defined
power to care for retarded persons who could not be committed to
state institutions. l l
Judge Concerned for Budget
In the Ohio case (In re Simpson), the judge was explicit in his
concern for the state budget and the monetary burden of the retarded.
His decision is a superb example of the way in which the benefits to
be derived from sterilization need not be seen in strictly eugenic
terms, but in the simple framework of increased taxation and monetaryexpenditure:
This girl is likely to become pregnant repeatedly and produce children for
whom she cannot provide even the rudiments of maternal care. There is the
further probability that such offspring will also be mentally deficient and
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become a public ch arge for most of their lives. Application has been made
to the Muskingum Cou nty Welfare Department for aid for depe nd e nt chil dre n payments for th e c hild a lready born. To permit Nora Ann to h ave
further children would resu lt in additional burdens upon the county and
state welfare departments whi ch have already been compelled to reduce
payments b ecause of a sh ortage of funds .... It is t he opinion of this cou rt
that the welfare of both Nora Ann Simpson and society would best be
serve d by having a n operation performed which would prevent further pregnanci es. 12

Aside from the obvious monetary considerations in this passage,
there are also several crucial assumptions about the condition of the
mentally retarded person involved. The court assumes that 1) she will
be promiscuous, 2) she will provide no maternal care, and 3) her children will likewise be retarded. There is unfortunately little evidence
given from which one could t est the accuracy of applying such serious
labels to the defendant in this case.
Cases of this nature in which such broad statutory language was
used to authorize sterilization have generally occurred in local probate
or juvenile courts. In the last five years, however, two major decisions
by state supreme courts in Nebraska and Oregon have upheld the
power of the state to sterilize the retarded under specific provisions of
state law. In Oregon (Cook vs State), the court held constitutional a
law permitting state sterilization of those found by a board to be
unable to provide adequate care for their children. Though the statute
does specifically refer to the "parent's inability by reason of mental
illness or mental retardation to provide adequate care," the aim of the
law would force its expansion to a broad class of those deemed "bad
parents." In upholding the law, the court failed to mention any supposed procreative rights of the retarded. The court felt that the Supreme Court had already dealt with these questions, and that in other
decisions, "the premise that state sterilization laws are constitutional
when validly drawn was not disturbed." In its most explicit defense of
the power of the state, any mention of rights is noticeably absent:
The state's concern for the welfare of its citizenry extends to future generations and when there is overwhelming evidence, as th ere is h e re , that a
potential parent will be unable to provide a proper environment for a
child, because of his own mental retardation, the state has sufficient interest
to order sterilization. 13

In Nebraska (In re Cavitt), the state supreme court, by a one vote
margin, upheld a law found unconstitutional by a lower court which
permitted a board to order sterilization as a precondition of release
from a state home for the retarded. Here, the majority opinion did at
least consider the question of individual rights, but as in the other
cases, the state power was judged greater:
It can hardly be disputed that the right of a woman to bear and the right
of a man to beget children is a natural and constitutional right, nor can it be
successfully disputed that no citizen has any rights that are superior to the
common welfare. Acting for the common good the state in the exercise of
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its police powers may impose reasonable restrictions upon the natural and
constitut ional rights of its citizens. 14

The court went on to claim that mental retardation is precisely such
a situation where reasonable restrictions are justified. The assumption
that sterilization is only a "reasonable restriction" was not unique to
this court. It appears in many of the other decisions. 15 Yet the permanent nature of sterilization does seem to differentiate it qualitatively from other activities like compulsory vaccination or even
obscenity laws.
Frequent Recurrence of Two Points
In these cases which uphold the sterilization of the retarded and t he
insane, two points recur with great frequency. The first is the way in
which the label "mentally retarded" is expanded and re-phrased to
include much more than the original expression may mean. The mentally retarded are referred to in terms which stress their status as
onerous and burdensome to others. In an earlier era, this burdensome
status was reflected in the fact that the label "feebleminded" almost
always meant that the person was liable to have other "feebleminded"
children who would have to be cared for by the ·state. Most" courts
simply assumed this, as did the Michigan State Supreme Court in
Smith us Wayne (1925), when it wrote: "It definitely appears that
science has demonstrated to a reasonable degree of certainty that
feeblemindedness is hereditary." 16 This simple Mendelian picture of
genotypically retarded offspring has been replaced by more complex
explanations; but new meanings of the label "retarded" have been
developed which still stress the burden of the retarded. Before, the
emphasis was on bearing retarded offspring. The new claim is that the
retarded will be unable to provide care for their children, who will
thus become a burden to the state. A good example of this approach is
the Oregon law noted above which provided for sterilization when a
board found these persons likely to have children they could not care
for . 17
Aside from the underlying interpretation of retardation which
stressed the burden of the retarded, courts frequently referred to these
persons as "degenerate," which is a significantly more lurid term . At
other times they are referred to as "socially inadequate" in an undefined manner. Often the terms idiocy and imbecility are used in vague
ways, so that mental retardation comes to be equated with "idiocy"
and "imbecility" which are much more emotively laden terms. The
most revealing example of this transformation of labels comes from
Holmes' opinion in Buck us Bell:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may calion th e best
citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those
already who sap the strength of the state for these lesser sacrifices, often not
felt to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped
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by incompetence. It is better for all the world, if instead of having to
execute d egenerate offspring for crime, or let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing
their kind.18

Here the risks in labeling are readily apparent. Carrie Buck is not
s imply retarded. She is described as an "imbecile," as one who will
bear "degenerate" offspring, and as "manifestly unfit" for procreation. Furthermore, the danger inherent in such use of labels is highlighted when one realizes that the "third generation of imbeciles"
referred to by Justice Holmes was a baby who was only one month
old at the time when it was appraised as retarded. 19
The second and even more crucial element in these cases is the
moral outlook which contains a definite view of the relation between
supposed rights and benefits. In a general way, this view saw rights as a
personal interest which had to be adjudicated in terms of the benefits
derived from the pursuit of this interest. This outlook can be seen in
several of the passages quoted above, most notably in Holmes' famous
dictum. A more outright formulation of this perspective comes from
Smith us Wayne, in which a court for the first time held constitutional
a strictly eugenic sterilization law:
In view of these facts what are the legal rights of this class of citizens as to
the procreation of children? It is true that the right to beget children is a
natural and constitutional right, but it is equally true that no citizen has any
rights superior to the common welfare. Acting for the public good , . .. the
state may always impose reasonable restrictions upon the natural and constitutional rights of its citizens. Measured by its injurious effect upon society
what right has any citizen to b eget children with an inherited tendency to
crime, feeblemindedness, idiocy or imbecility? This is the right for which
Willie Smith is contending. It is a right which the statute enacted for the
common welfare denies him.20

This is quite clearly an adjudication of the exercise of rights in terms
of benefits and harms. The court explicitly says that this is the measurement used. Later on in this same opinion, the court provided the
most outlandish statement of this position when it wrote: "It is an
historic fact that every forward step in the progress of the race has
been marked by an interference with individual liberties. "21
Courts Not Precise in Definitions
In utilizing this general perspective, the courts were not very precise
in their definitions of either of the key terms "benefits" or "rights."
The former was commonly referred to as the "general welfare," but
this is not very helpful in understanding the kinds of benefits or goods
that could override the presumed rights involved. Generally in the
cases cited above, the consequences which are described as sufficient
to override the presumed rights involved are two. First, there is the
obvious concern with "racial health" which marks the eugenic basis of
much of the early legislative activity in the field. This is manifested in
May, 1978
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phrases about "race degeneracy" or "racial progress" which dot the
judicial landscape on these matters before and after Bell. One particularly good example is the view of the Virginia State Supreme Court in
the case of Bell. Here the court held state sterilization a valid exercise
of the police power in order "to promote the welfare of society by
mitigating race degeneracy and raising the average standard of intelligence of the people of the state." 22
This patently eugenic definition of the welfare secured or enhanced
by the sterilization of the retarded has been supplemented in some
cases by a second monetary consideration. Several of the decisions
quoted above make explicit references to the increased costs to the
state of allowing these persons to reproduce. This is a much broader
and less easily disproved concern than the older eugenic basis. If the
Mendelian picture of inherited retardation is accurate, then the costs
are obvious. If it is not, it may still be possible to point to the notion
that the retarded will be unable to care for their children and the state
will be called in to assume responsibility.
These two understandings of the welfare that would be adversely
affected if the retarded had children were both general in nature and
could easily serve to justify state action in this area. This, however,
seemed to leave the exercise of possible right involved here to be
determined by the benefits that might accrue to a large number of
people through the exercise or suppression of those rights. One way of
altering the statist implications of this result was to argve in terms of
benefits which would also come to the individual who would be sterilized. Frequently this was done on the assumption that certain individuals could function outside of institutions if they did not have to
worry about pregnancy or the care of children. For example, in In re
Cavitt, the Nebraska Supreme Court wrote of "the probability that
additional reponsibilities of parenthood would in all likelihood handicap her potential rehabilitation ." In a later section of the opinion, the
court was at pains to point out that "sterilization does no harm to the
patient other than to eliminate his capacity to procreate. "23 Similar
applications of a benefit-harm calculus to individuals themselves
appear in several other court opinions. 24
A more forceful method was followed by the Utah legislature when
in a 1925 law, it specifically granted to the boards of control of
various state institutions, including the prison, the power to order
sterilization when, in the opinion of the board, "The welfare of the
inmate and of society will be promoted by such sterilization." Further, the act specified that when the warden or superintendent of any
institution "shall be of the opinion that it is for the best interests of
any inmate of the institution under his care and of society that such
inmate be sexually sterilized," he is required to present a petition to
the governing board seeking approval for such action. 25 Subsequently
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the law was held valid by th~ state supreme court, but in the instant
case, the court held that the requirement of benefit to the individual
had not been met and thus reversed an order for sterilization. 26
In conjunction with the various meanings given to the concept of
"welfare" or "benefit," the courts were also unclear about the status
of the right involved. As we saw before, some courts were not even
sure that it was a right, and others were only willing to call procreation an "interest" of the individual. In general, most of these courts
were reluctant to discuss procreation as a fundamental human right, at
least until recently. This can be brought into sharp relief by a contrast
that can be seen right in the cases themselves. Several of the early laws
establishing state sterilization of the retarded failed to provide for a
hearing at which the affected person or his/her attorney could present
counter evidence and cross-examine those desiring his/her sterilization.
Every court that considered this question struck down the omission of
a hearing as a gross violation of a fundamental right to procedural
justice embodied in the "due process" clause of the Constitution. 27
If this is a paradigm of a fundamental right which the court was
willing to uphold, even for the retarded, it is clear that any supposed
right of reproduction was a good deal less fundamental than that in
the minds of the courts. 28 Perhaps the idea of "interest" best elucidates the uncertain meaning of the "rights" language that appears in
these decisions. A right to procreate is not a fundamental human right,
but only one personal interest among many that an individual may
pursue. This seems also indicated by the approach noted above which
argued that there might be other benefits to the individual from sterilization. Here the courts simply place reproduction as one interest
among many which may be fostered by state action, with nothing
more fundamental about it than other types of activity. 29
In these cases, we find a consistent pattern which combines onerous
labels that stress the burden of the retarded, with a pattern of reasoning which employs that perception of the burden to justify permanent
elimination of the reproductive powers of the retarded. By labeling
the retarded in ways which stress and magnify their burden on society,
these courts make it a simple matter to employ a rather crude costbenefit analysis to determine if the retarded shall be allowed any
potential reproductive power at all; their alleged burdensome status
makes the outcome of such an analysis almost a foregone conclusion.
II.

This rather obvious form of cost-benefit reasoning was not the only
pattern of ethical reasoning employed by the courts in dealing with
the question of sterilization by the state of those labeled retarded.
Though it was widely employed, it was by no means universal. Several
important court decisions involving state sterilization discussed the
May, 1978
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procreative process in terms clearly implying a rejection or serious
modification of the framework analyzed above.
To begin with, the Supreme Court itself in Skinner us Oklahoma
(1941) declared a state punitive sterilization law unconstitutional on
equal protection grounds. In the opinion written by Justice Douglas, a
new concern, procreative rights, appears clearly in the foreground:
Marriage and procreation are fundamentals of the very existence and survival of the race. The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far
reaching and devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause races
or types which are inimical to the dominant group to disappear. There is no
redemption for the individual whom the law touches. Any experiment
which the state conducts is to his irreparable injury . He is forever deprived
of a basic liberty. 30

The outlook here has shifted a great deal from that espoused in
Bell. Procreation is seen as a basic liberty which the state must protect
against intrusion and suppression. This is made evident at the outset of
the decision. Justice Douglas's first sentences read: "This case touches
a sensitive and important area of human rights. Oklahoma deprives
certain individuals of a right which is basic to the perpetuation of a
race - the right to have offspring. "31 In reading this decision, one
receives the strong impression that the police power of the state is not
seen as including the power irrevocably to suppress this basic right.
This view is stated more openly by Justice Jackson who wrote in a
concurring opinion to Skinner: "There are limits to the extent to
which a legislatively represented majority may conduct biological experiments at the expense of the dignity and personality and natural
powers of the minority - even those who have been guilty of what the
majority defines as a crime." 32
The emphasis in this last passage on limits beyond which the police
power of the state cannot go was voiced earlier than Skinner in several
important court decisions and dissenting opinions concerning the sterilization of the retarded. The most direct and forceful enunciation of
this view of fundamental rights involved is contained in a dissent to
Smith us Wayne. Writing for himself and two others, Justice Weist of
the Michigan state supreme court argued:
Bills of rights in American constitutions are not grants of r ights to the
creators thereof nor do they m easure the rights of the governed . They
declare some inhe re nt rights superior to the police power and inhibit violation thereof. The inherent right of mankind to pass through life without
mutilation of organs or glands of ge neration needs no declaration in constitutions, for the right existed long before constitutions of governm ents, was not
lost or surrendered to legislative control in the creation of governm ent, and
is beyond the reach of the governmental agency known as police powe r. 33

This passage is evidence of a basic difference of moral outlook from
the majority opinion which referred to interference with the liberties
of the individual on behalf of the progress of the race. It should be
noted, however, that the right which is here so vigorously defended is
124
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not quite the same as the "right to procreate" enunciated in Skinner.
Here the right seems associated with "bodily integrity" or a right not
to be mutilated by the state. This is still a stress on basic human rights,
but the precise nature of the right appealed to has changed.
Two cases from the first decade of litigation on this issue, from
1910 to 1920, broached the subject of fundamental rights in a similarly direct manner. In a 1917 case, In re Thompson, the New York Supreme Court specifically held a eugenic sterilization law to be unconstitutional on two grounds. 34 The first was an equal protection basis
that held that the burden of sterilization would fall hardest on those already under state care and thus would be inherently unjust with reference to those selected to be sterilized. It would tend to miss those who
were wealthy enough to be cared for at home or in a private hospital,
and this would deprive some of the retarded of the equal protection
of the law.
The other ground for the holding was " that the laws of our state
which have been sustained by our courts as a proper exercise of the
police power are not found to be a justification of this law." In short,
the forceable sterilization of the mentally retarded was a power that
the state did not possess. The court saw the mentally retarded man
who was the subject of the case as a unfortunate poor victim of
retardation. As such, they reasoned, he was not a harm to the state
but rather, because of his condition, ought to be "cared for and
treated and strengthened and developed if possible." Sterilization in
order to save future expense was not, in the opinion of this court, a
caring act. According to the court, "such does not seem to this court
to be the proper exercise of the police power. It seems almost inhuman in its nature."36 Though the New York court did not discuss the
rights involved in any detail, it is significant that it saw a limit beyond
which the police power of the state could not go.
Court Cites Precedent
As basis for its concerns, the New York court cited as precedent the
New Jersey Supreme Court decision of 1913 (Smith us Board of
Examiners) which held a eugenic sterilization law unconstitutional. 37
Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Bell, this decision was cited by
several other state courts as precedent for finding state sterilization
laws unconstitutional. 38 Reading the decision, it is clear that the
court saw this as a threat to the liberty of the individual "of the
gravest magnitude." They specifically noted that the law "with which
we deal threatens the life and certainly the liberty of the prosecutrix
in a manner forbidden by both the state and federal constitutions
unless such an order is a valid exercise of the police power."39 Seeing
the right involved in such fundamental terms, they were hence
May, 1978
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extremely reluctant to sanction state intrusion in this area. Some passages will serve to capture the concerns of the court:
For while the case in hand raises the very important and novel question
whether it is one of the attributes of government to essay the theoretical
improvement of society by destroying the function of procreation in certain
of its members who are not malefactors against its laws, it is evident that the
decision of that question carries with it certain logical consequences having
far reaching results. For the feebleminded and epileptics are not the only
persons in the community whose elimination as undesirable citizens would
or might in the judgment of the legislature be a distinct benefit to society. If
the enforced sterility of this class be a legitimate exercise of governmental
power, a wide field of legislative activity and duty is thrown open to which
it would be difficult to assign a legal limit. 40

The court went on to suggest that racism or Malthusian considerations
could be used by some legislatures to enforce sterility on certain classes
in society. It concluded, on the basis of such concerns, thus:
Evidently the large and underlying question is how far government is con·
stitutionally justified in the theoretical betterment of society by means of
the surgical sterilization of certain of its unoffending but undesirable members. If some, but by no means all of these illustrations are fanciful, they
still serve their purpose of indicating why we place the decision of the
present case upon a ground that has no such logical results or untoward
consequences. 41

The court declared the law unconstitutional on equal protection
grounds because the law applied only to those in state institutions. It
is clear, however, that the court was gravely concerned with granting
to the state the power to sterilize some of its citizens. The New Jersey
court's perception of a serious invasion of personal liberty involved in
this new acquisition of power by the state is a forceful example of the
difference in judicial outlook from such a case as Bell where one of
the most famous jurists in American history did not discuss some of
the issues raised almost 15 years earlier.
In this group of judicial opinions, we find a very different perspective in precisely the same areas of concern that we examined in the
previous set of cases. First, these courts are more aware of the ambiguous process of labeling and of the potential for harm in labels themselves. Second, they seem much less willing to view procreation and
procreative rights in the broad cost-benefit terms employed by the
other courts.
The New Jersey case just discussed is an excellent example of a
much different sensitivity to the labeling process. The court here
expressed deep concern that if the sterilization of one class, like the
retarded, is permitted, then other groups arbitrarily labeled as undesirable by a legislature could also be sterilized: "There are other things
besides physical or mental diseases that may render persons undesirable, or might do so in the opinion of a majority of a prevailing
legislature. "(Italics mine.)42 The evident concern here is that a simple
majority' of a legislature might label whole groups as "manifestly
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unfit" or "degenerate" and set them up as target groups for a sterilization program.
In another set of cases, the concern for the onerous and degrading
label of "having been sterilized" was itself severely challenged. In two
separate decisions , state sterilization of criminals was ruled unconstitutional as "cruel and unusual punishment." The thrust of both decisions was that the permanent mark or label of sterilization is degrading
in the extreme. The judge in the first case (Davis vs Berry) explicitly
wrote : "The physical suffering may not be so great but that is not the
only test of cruel punishment; the humiliation, the degradation, the
mental suffering are always present and known by all the public and
will follow him wherever he may go. This belongs to the dark ages." 43
This conclusion was reinforced in Mickle vs Henricks which pointed to
the onerous status of the sterilized as a permanent punishment which
could not be removed once an offender paid a specified penalty for his
crime. 44
In each of these cases, a perception of the ambiguous and potentially harmful nature of labels is clearly before the mind of the court.
Another significant departure from the use of labels exemplified by
Holmes comes from the New York Supreme Court. In re Thompson
challenged sterilization as an exercise of police power directly. In this
decision, the court also challenged the very labels used by other
courts and legislatures. First, they pointed not to what "science has
proved," but to contradictory testimony and evidence of the desirability of sterilizing the retarded. Second, they do not refer to the retarded in the lurid language of Justice Holmes . They are never referred
to as "degenerate." They are "patients," "unfortunates," or "unfortunate victims," but never "manifestly unfit" or "imbecilic." 45
The most illuminating differences over the use of labels and their
meanings comes from the strong dissenting opinion in Smith vs
Wayne. Throughout his vigorous attack on the majority, Justice Weist
constantly refers to these people as "unfortunates," unlike the majority which used the terms "idiot," "imbecile," and "degenerate" rather
indiscriminately. Furthermore, he challenged the accuracy and meaningfulness of the labeling process itself and cited a great deal of evidence on the ambiguity of labels like "imbecile" or "idiot." Finally,
he challenged the assumption that the label "feebleminded" also
meant "manifestly unfit" for procreation. 46 Alongside of the open
preference of the majority for a cost-benefit calculation to justify the
sterilization of "degenerates," this dissent launches a frontal attack on
both the use of labels and the ethical reasoning which were pillars of
the majority opinion.
Opinion Exemplifies Differences
This dissenting opinion provides the strongest example of the differences between this group of cases and those previously discussed in
May, 1978

127

the second major area of concern: the ethical reasoning employed. All
of these judges do recognize that there will be some additional expense to the state if these people do have children. Even if the children are perfectly normal, at least som~ of these people may not be
able to provide adequate care and adoption agencies will be called into
the picture. Furthermore, one of the favorite arguments of the proponents of sterilization was that these people could be sterilized and
then released from permanent care facilities. These decisions that we
are now considering recognize that their alternative of providing permanent care where necessary would be more costly than such a
scheme. In all of these ways these courts recognized increased costs of
the failure to sterilize. What they did not grant was that such considerations were the only ones that counted in such decisions. Specifically,
there were certain fundamental rights which could not be reduced to
the confines of such a calculation of "welfare" as it was often vaguely
defined. As we have noted above, the courts were not as precise as one
might wish in specifying just what these rights were. Three different
rights were employed, generally with the same result: sterilization by
the state was a violation of such rights and its constitutional status was
at least doubtful.
The first right relied on was a "right to procreate," which was
usually seen as an aspect of personal liberty protected from state
suppression by the 14th Amendment. This was the right stressed by
the Supreme Court in Skinner us Oklahoma and by the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Smith us Board of Examiners. It is a straightforward
claim that the liberty protected by the Constitution encompasses the
liberty to procreate and is thus beyond the reach of state law. The
second right which was sometimes utilized might be referred to as a
right to "bodily integrity." This is perhaps analogous to the principle
of totality in Catholic moral theology in that it does not stress procreation as a personal liberty so much as a right not to be "mutilated"
or to have bodily functions destroyed on the basis of some vague
notion that it will lead to some desirable consequences. Such an
arrangement as this is openly embedded in the dissent in Smith us
Wayne which speaks of "an inherent right of mankind to pass through
life without mutilation of organs," and earlier, of "the inherent right
of bodily integrity." 47
These two types of rights were employed to attack the general
claim of the state to have the power to sterilize the retarded on behalf
of benefits secured to the public welfare. A third type of right seems
to be employed in a more limited fashion . This is the concept of a
right to humane care by the state. This right was put forward by some
courts to counter the argument discussed earlier that linked sterilization with release from permanent care facilities. Though the argument
was not very well developed, these courts argued that this was an
inhumane way to deal with seriously retarded and unfortunate people.
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The New Jersey court was enraged by the idea : "The palpable inhumanity and immorality of such a scheme forbid us to impute it to an
enlightened legislature." In New York the court flatly rejected the
idea that sterilization was a humane act toward the retarded: "It
seems to be a tendency almost inhuman in its nature." The poor,
unfortunate victims of retardation had a claim to be cared for and
"strengthened if possible" by the state; sterilization was seen as hardly
a caring act. 48
These rights differ in important ways. The first two are examples of
what Golding has termed "option-rights."49 These are rights bound
up with the notion of human liberty, of being free from restraint or
coercion in the performance of the actions in question. The "right to
procreate" is a good example of such a claim to freedom in the performance of certain actions . The second right, involving notions of
"bodily integrity," is also a claim to be free from the infringement
imposed by the actions of the state, but it differs from the former in
significant ways. It is not a claim to be allowed to act in certain ways.
It is a claim to freedom from harms which may be done to the person
by the state. The notion of "freedom from" is still involved, but it is
not necessary to include the notion of an option to perform certain
types of action, e.g., reproduction. One could still respect this right
and yet, through a system of institutional care, prevent the exercise of
the reproductive capacity.50
Rightness and Freedom
This right seems to be bound up with the notion of the rightness of
certain "states of being" and of freedom from harm or damage to
these states of being. Another avenue which the courts did not explore
to support this freedom from "mutilation" would be to examine the
irreversibility of such mutilation as contrasted with other types of
restriction on the exercise of the procreative capacity. This would not
necessitate a long discussion of what constitutes "bodily integrity"
that the former approach ultimately seems to demand. The discussion
of the irreversible nature of the mutilation involved would correlate
well with the way in which these courts recognize the imperfection of
the human labels given to the retarded and the insane. If the process
of social designation is so ambiguous and uncertain, then there would
seem to be a strong presumption against the irreversible destruction of
a basic human capacity on the basis of the meaningfulness of such
labels. 51
The third type of right that is appealed to in these cases is an
example of what Golding calls "welfare-rights." These involve not
freedom from coercion, but claims or entitlements 52 to certain types
of goods which may be necessary for minimal human dignity, preservation of life, self-perfection in virtue, or other worthwhile ends. With
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respect to the treatment of the retarded, this type of right has received
a great deal of attention in recent years as courts and experts have
developed the notion of a "right to treatment" or a "right to a certain
standard of care" for those committed to institutions for the retarded
or the insane . 53
Though the two types of rights, welfare-rights and option-rights, are
distinct in theory, they often combine in complex ways in most of our
common discourse about rights. 54 One can see this here. The right to
humane care or right to treatment seems to be predicated upon some
notion of human dignity which may also include limitations on what
others may do to the person, e.g., not mutilate him. Alternatively, the
capacity to procreate may be an important, if not essential aspect of
human dignity, 55 and maintaining the right of the individual to procreate may be an element in the respect for the dignity of persons
which lies at the base of the right to humane care which is present, if
only in a truncated form, in these cases.
It is unnecessary to explore all the ramifications of the notions of
rights discussed above. But it is important to keep in mind the different types of rights being claimed and the different way in which each
right functions and interacts with other moral claims.
We find thus that in both of the areas that we are examining, there
are significant disagreements in these cases from that large majority we
examined earlier. Where they spoke of degenerates, these judges speak
of unfortunates; where they spoke of racial decline and increased
welfare costs, these judges speak of the right of the retarded to bodily
integrity and humane care by the state.
The first group of cases which we considered represents an obvious,
if rather unsophisticated form of utilitarianism. The cost-benefit
analysis of human rights was supported by Bentham and has been
suggested by many of his followers. It must be noted, however, that
this is not the only form of utilitarianism which could be employed,
perhaps with different results. Rule utilitarians, however, would face
the issue of labeling in a much more stark fashion. The simple costbenefit calculus disposes of rights rather quickly; but the subtler forms
of utilitarianism may be strong supporters of rights in the context of
an overall utility to the system of rights. They would, however, be
faced squarely with the question of how to respond to the rights of
"degenerates" whose reproduction is thought to threaten either the
intelligence or the pocketbook of the state.
Rule utilitarians would be faced with the difficulty of deciding
between the qualitative worth of various kinds of beneficent outcomes. If they opt for fidelity to the rights of the retarded at each
juncture, then it is questionable whether or not they can be called
utilitarians in any meaningful way . They would then be making qualitative judgments which their basic position does not seem to allow for.
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If, on the other hand, they wish to judge fidelity to the rights of the

retarded along with other conceivable outcomes of policy decisions,
they will be faced with the question of the accuracy of labels like
"degenerates." In this way, the labels given to the retarded might have
an even more powerful influence in the context of a more sophisticated form of utilitarianism than they do here in the simple analysis
of the courts convinced of the importance of protecting the taxpayers'
pocketbooks. 56
The alternative views that we have seen in some judicial opinions
were sensitive to a broader range of concerns than these utilitarian
considerations. Though they did believe that such calculations were
important, they were not definitely determinative of the result. There
were limits on what the state could do even when such quantitative
analysis seemed to support it. This renewed sensitivity to the fundamental rightness of certain acts, relationships, or states of being independent of considerations of utility is supported by a renewed sensitivity to the moral issues of labeling itself.

Retarded As Victims, Not Threat
By seeing the retarded as unfortunate victims and not as an imminent threat, these courts reversed the cost-benefit analysis in favor of
the retarded. They spoke not of benefits to the state or the race, but
of humane care for the retarded . In this case, the renewed sensitivity
to other than utilitarian considerations combined with a sensitivity to
the vagaries of labeling. This combination meant that the cost-benefit
. analysis was questioned both in terms of ethical theory and in terms
of its application to the retarded. If the labeling of the retarded was as
uncertain as these courts suggested, then it was not even certain that
the cost-benefit analysis itself would justify sterilization, aside from
the limits of the theory in general. Furthermore, if, as some courts
recognized, there is a serious degradation and psychological harm associated with sterilization, especially coercive sterilization, then it may
be that even marking someone in this way could be seriously counterproductive even in utilitarian terms.
In this essay, I have examined the way in which courts have dealt
with the reproductive rights of the retarded. In the process, I have
examined the way in which conflicting labels have functioned in the
context of two very different types of ethical theory which have
shaped state action on behalf of the retarded. If we are to act on
behalf of the retarded in morally sensitive ways, we must recognize
the serious conflict over fundamentally moral issues which lies
beneath the surface of public policy disputes. It is hoped that this
essay helps to illuminate these questions.
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